A person may represent another person in legal relations as provided by law or by juridical act. This is called representation.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The authority of the representative may be conferred by law, by contract, such as mandate or partnership, or by the unilateral juridical act of procuration.
Amended by Acts 1871, No. 87; Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A procuration is a unilateral juridical act by which a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the representative, to represent the principal in legal relations.
The procuration may be addressed to the representative or to a person with whom the representative is authorized to represent the principal in legal relations.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A procuration is subject to the rules governing mandate to the extent that the application of those rules is compatible with the nature of the procuration.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more affairs for the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
In all matters for which no special provision is made in this Title, the contract of mandate is governed by the Titles of "Obligations in General" and "Conventional Obligations or Contracts".
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The contract of mandate may serve the exclusive or the common interest of the principal, the mandatary, or a third person.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The contract of mandate may be either onerous or gratuitous. It is gratuitous in the absence of contrary agreement.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The contract of mandate is not required to be in any particular form.
Nevertheless, when the law prescribes a certain form for an act, a mandate authorizing the act must be in that form.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal may confer on the mandatary general authority to do whatever is appropriate under the circumstances.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandatary may perform all acts that are incidental to or necessary for the performance of the mandate.
The authority granted to a mandatary to perform an act that is an ordinary part of his profession or calling, or an act that follows from the nature of his profession or calling, need not be specified.
A mandatary shall not prevent or limit reasonable communication, visitation, or interaction between a principal who is over the age of eighteen years and another person without prior court approval, to be granted only upon a showing of good cause by the mandatary, unless express authority has been provided pursuant to Article 2997(7).
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 2016, No. 110, §1, eff. May 19, 2016.
The authority to alienate, acquire, encumber, or lease a thing must be given expressly. Neither the property nor its location need be specifically described.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Authority also must be given expressly to:
(1) Make an inter vivos donation, either outright or to a new or existing trust or other custodial arrangement, and, when also expressly so provided, to impose such conditions on the donation, including, without limitation, the power to revoke, that are not contrary to the other express terms of the mandate.
(2) Accept or renounce a succession.
(3) Contract a loan, acknowledge or make remission of a debt, or become a surety.
(4) Draw or endorse promissory notes and negotiable instruments.
(5) Enter into a compromise or refer a matter to arbitration.
(6) Make health care decisions, such as surgery, medical expenses, nursing home residency, and medication.
(7) Prevent or limit reasonable communication, visitation, or interaction between the principal and a relative by blood, adoption, or affinity within the third degree, or another individual who has a relationship based on or productive of strong affection.
Amended by Acts 1981, No. 572, §1; Acts 1990, No. 184, §1; Acts 1992, No. 304, §1; Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 2001, No. 594, §1; Acts 2016, No. 110, §1, eff. May 19, 2016.
A mandatary who represents the principal as the other contracting party may not contract with himself unless he is authorized by the principal, or, in making such contract, he is merely fulfilling a duty to the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A person of limited capacity may act as a mandatary for matters for which he is capable of contracting. In such a case, the rights of the principal against the mandatary are subject to the rules governing the obligations of persons of limited capacity.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A person may be the mandatary of two or more parties, such as a buyer and a seller, for the purpose of transacting one or more affairs involving all of them. In such a case, the mandatary must disclose to each party that he also represents the other.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandatary is bound to fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate he has accepted. He is responsible to the principal for the loss that the principal sustains as a result of the mandatary's failure to perform.
Amended by Acts 1979, No. 711, §1; Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
When the mandate is gratuitous, the court may reduce the amount of loss for which the mandatary is liable.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
At the request of the principal, or when the circumstances so require, the mandatary is bound to provide information and render an account of his performance of the mandate. The mandatary is bound to notify the principal, without delay, of the fulfillment of the mandate.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandatary is bound to deliver to the principal everything he received by virtue of the mandate, including things he received unduly.
The mandatary may retain in his possession sufficient property of the principal to pay the mandatary's expenses and remuneration.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandatary owes interest, from the date used, on sums of money of the principal that the mandatary applies to his own use.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
In the absence of contrary agreement, the mandatary is bound to fulfill the mandate himself.
Nevertheless, if the interests of the principal so require, when unforeseen circumstances prevent the mandatary from performing his duties and he is unable to communicate with the principal, the mandatary may appoint a substitute.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
When the mandatary is authorized to appoint a substitute, he is answerable to the principal for the acts of the substitute only if he fails to exercise diligence in selecting the substitute or in giving instructions.
When not authorized to appoint a substitute, the mandatary is answerable to the principal for the acts of the substitute as if the mandatary had performed the mandate himself.
In all cases, the principal has recourse against the substitute.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
If the mandatary exceeds his authority, he is answerable to the principal for resulting loss that the principal sustains.
The principal is not answerable to the mandatary for loss that the mandatary sustains because of acts that exceed his authority unless the principal ratifies those acts.
Acts 1997, No. 261, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Multiple mandataries are not solidarily liable to their common principal, unless the mandate provides otherwise.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal is bound to the mandatary to perform the obligations that the mandatary contracted within the limits of his authority. The principal is also bound to the mandatary for obligations contracted by the mandatary after the termination of the mandate if at the time of contracting the mandatary did not know that the mandate had terminated.
The principal is not bound to the mandatary to perform the obligations that the mandatary contracted which exceed the limits of the mandatary's authority unless the principal ratifies those acts.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandatary acts within the limits of his authority even when he fulfills his duties in a manner more advantageous to the principal than was authorized.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal is bound to reimburse the mandatary for the expenses and charges he has incurred and to pay him the remuneration to which he is entitled.
The principal is bound to reimburse and pay the mandatary even though without the mandatary's fault the purpose of the mandate was not accomplished.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal is bound to compensate the mandatary for loss the mandatary sustains as a result of the mandate, but not for loss caused by the fault of the mandatary.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal owes interest from the date of the expenditure on sums expended by the mandatary in performance of the mandate.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Multiple principals for an affair common to them are solidarily bound to their mandatary.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A mandatary who contracts in the name of the principal within the limits of his authority does not bind himself personally for the performance of the contract.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A mandatary who contracts in his own name without disclosing his status as a mandatary binds himself personally for the performance of the contract.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A mandatary who enters into a contract and discloses his status as a mandatary, though not his principal, binds himself personally for the performance of the contract. The mandatary ceases to be bound when the principal is disclosed.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A mandatary who exceeds his authority is personally bound to the third person with whom he contracts, unless that person knew at the time the contract was made that the mandatary had exceeded his authority or unless the principal ratifies the contract.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal is bound to perform the contract that the mandatary, acting within the limits of his authority, makes with a third person.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
One who causes a third person to believe that another person is his mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts with the putative mandatary.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts in the name of the principal, or in his own name as mandatary, is bound to the principal for the performance of the contract.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts without disclosing his status or the identity of the principal is bound to the principal for the performance of the contract unless the obligation is strictly personal or the right non-assignable. The third person may raise all defenses that may be asserted against the mandatary or the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
In addition to causes of termination of contracts under the Titles governing "Obligations in General" and "Conventional Obligations or Contracts", both the mandate and the authority of the mandatary terminate upon the:
(1) Death of the principal or of the mandatary.
(2) Interdiction of the mandatary.
(3) Qualification of the curator after the interdiction of the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal may terminate the mandate and the authority of the mandatary at any time. A mandate in the interest of the principal, and also of the mandatary or of a third party, may be irrevocable, if the parties so agree, for as long as the object of the contract may require.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
In the absence of contrary agreement, neither the contract nor the authority of the mandatary is terminated by the principal's incapacity, disability, or other condition that makes an express revocation of the mandate impossible or impractical.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Until filed for recordation, a revocation or modification of a recorded mandate is ineffective as to the persons entitled to rely upon the public records.
Amended by Acts 1882, No. 19; Acts 1981, No. 303, §1; Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The principal must notify third persons with whom the mandatary was authorized to contract of the revocation of the mandate or of the mandatary's authority. If the principal fails to do so, he is bound to perform the obligations that the mandatary has undertaken.
Amended by Acts 1882, No. 19; Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
The mandate and the authority of the mandatary terminate when the mandatary notifies the principal of his resignation or renunciation of his authority. When a mandatary has reasonable grounds to believe that the principal lacks capacity, the termination is effective only when the mandatary notifies another mandatary or a designated successor mandatary. In the absence of another mandatary or a designated successor mandatary, the termination is effective when the mandatary notifies a person with a sufficient interest in the welfare of the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 2014, No. 356, §2.
The mandatary is bound to complete an undertaking he had commenced at the time of the principal's death if delay would cause injury.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
If the mandatary does not know that the mandate or his authority has terminated and enters into a contract with a third person who is in good faith, the contract is enforceable.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Upon termination of the mandate, unless this obligation has been expressly dispensed with, the mandatary is bound to account for his performance to the principal.
Acts 1997, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Suretyship is an accessory contract by which a person binds himself to a creditor to fulfill the obligation of another upon the failure of the latter to do so.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Suretyship may be established for any lawful obligation, which, with respect to the suretyship, is the principal obligation.
The principal obligation may be subject to a term or condition, may be presently existing, or may arise in the future.
Amended by Acts 1979, No. 711, §1; Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
One who ostensibly binds himself as a principal obligor to satisfy the present or future obligations of another is nonetheless considered a surety if the principal cause of the contract with the creditor is to guarantee performance of such obligations.
A creditor in whose favor a surety and principal obligor are bound together as principal obligors in solido may presume they are equally concerned in the matter until he clearly knows of their true relationship.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Suretyship must be express and in writing.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Suretyship is established upon receipt by the creditor of the writing evidencing the surety's obligation. The creditor's acceptance is presumed and no notice of acceptance is required.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Suretyship may be qualified, conditioned, or limited in any lawful manner.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
There are three kinds of suretyship: commercial suretyship, legal suretyship, and ordinary suretyship.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A commercial suretyship is one in which:
(1) The surety is engaged in a surety business;
(2) The principal obligor or the surety is a business corporation, partnership, or other business entity;
(3) The principal obligation arises out of a commercial transaction of the principal obligor; or
(4) The suretyship arises out of a commercial transaction of the surety.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A commercial suretyship is one in which:
(1) The surety is engaged in a surety business;
(2) The principal obligor or the surety is a business corporation, partnership, or other business entity;
(3) The principal obligation arises out of a commercial transaction of the principal obligor; or
(4) The suretyship arises out of a commercial transaction of the surety.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
An ordinary suretyship is one that is neither a commercial suretyship nor a legal suretyship.
An ordinary suretyship must be strictly construed in favor of the surety.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety, or each surety when there is more than one, is liable to the creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, for the full performance of the obligation of the principal obligor, without benefit of division or discussion, even in the absence of an express agreement of solidarity.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The surety may assert against the creditor any defense to the principal obligation that the principal obligor could assert except lack of capacity or discharge in bankruptcy of the principal obligor.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety has the right of subrogation, the right of reimbursement, and the right to require security from the principal obligor.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The surety who pays the principal obligation is subrogated by operation of law to the rights of the creditor.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety who pays the creditor is entitled to reimbursement from the principal obligor. He may not recover reimbursement until the principal obligation is due and exigible.
A surety for multiple solidary obligors may recover from any of them reimbursement of the whole amount he has paid the creditor.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety who in good faith pays the creditor when the principal obligation is extinguished, or when the principal obligor had the means of defeating it, is nevertheless entitled to reimbursement from the principal obligor if the surety made a reasonable effort to notify the principal obligor that the creditor was insisting on payment or if the principal obligor was apprised that the creditor was insisting on payment.
The surety's rights against the creditor are not thereby excluded.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety may not recover from the principal obligor, by way of subrogation or reimbursement, the amount paid the creditor if the principal obligor also pays the creditor for want of being warned by the surety of the previous payment.
In these circumstances, the surety may recover from the creditor.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety may not recover from the principal obligor more than he paid to secure a discharge, but he may recover by subrogation such attorney's fees and interest as are owed with respect to the principal obligation.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety, before making payment, may demand security from the principal obligor to guarantee his reimbursement when:
(1) The surety is sued by the creditor;
(2) The principal obligor is insolvent, unless the principal obligation is such that its performance does not require his solvency;
(3) The principal obligor fails to perform an act promised in return for the suretyship; or
(4) The principal obligation is due or would be due but for an extension of its term not consented to by the surety.
The principal obligor may refuse to give security if the principal obligation is extinguished or if he has a defense against it.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
If, within ten days after the delivery of a written demand for the security, the principal obligor fails to provide the required security or fails to secure the discharge of the surety, the surety has an action to require the principal obligor to deposit into the registry of the court funds sufficient to satisfy the surety's obligation to the creditor as a pledge for the principal obligor's duty to reimburse the surety.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Co-sureties are those who are sureties for the same obligation of the same obligor. They are presumed to share the burden of the principal obligation in proportion to their number unless the parties agreed otherwise or contemplated that he who bound himself first would bear the entire burden of the obligation regardless of others who thereafter bind themselves independently of and in reliance upon the obligation of the former.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety who pays the creditor may proceed directly or by way of subrogation to recover from his co-sureties the share of the principal obligation each is to bear. If a co-surety becomes insolvent, his share is to be borne by those who would have borne it in his absence.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety who pays the creditor more than his share may recover the excess from his co-sureties in proportion to the amount of the obligation each is to bear as to him. If a surety obtains the conventional discharge of other co-sureties by paying the creditor, any reduction in the amount owed by those released benefits them proportionately.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The obligations of a surety are extinguished by the different manners in which conventional obligations are extinguished, subject to the following modifications.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The extinction of the principal obligation extinguishes the suretyship.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Prescription of the principal obligation extinguishes the obligation of the surety. A surety's action for contribution from his co-sureties and his action for reimbursement from the principal obligor prescribe in ten years.
The interruption of prescription against a surety is effective against the principal obligor and other sureties only when such parties have mutually agreed to be bound together with the surety against whom prescription was interrupted.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety may terminate the suretyship by notice to the creditor. The termination does not affect the surety's liability for obligations incurred by the principal obligor, or obligations the creditor is bound to permit the principal obligor to incur at the time the notice is received, nor may it prejudice the creditor or principal obligor who has changed his position in reliance on the suretyship.
Knowledge of the death of a surety has the same effect on a creditor as would a notice of termination received from the surety. A termination resulting from notice of the surety's death does not affect a universal successor of the surety who thereafter unequivocally confirms his willingness to continue to be bound thereby. The confirmation need not be in writing to be enforceable.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The modification or amendment of the principal obligation, or the impairment of real security held for it, by the creditor, in any material manner and without the consent of the surety, has the following effects.
An ordinary suretyship is extinguished.
A commercial suretyship is extinguished to the extent the surety is prejudiced by the action of the creditor, unless the principal obligation is one other than for the payment of money, and the surety should have contemplated that the creditor might take such action in the ordinary course of performance of the obligation. The creditor has the burden of proving that the surety has not been prejudiced or that the extent of the prejudice is less than the full amount of the surety's obligation.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The provisions governing commercial suretyship contained in this Title apply to legal suretyship except as otherwise provided in this Chapter.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The provisions of this Chapter apply to the extent they are not contrary to special laws governing particular kinds of legal suretyship.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Legal suretyship may be given only by a person authorized to conduct a surety business in Louisiana or by a natural person domiciled in this state who owns property in this state that is subject to seizure and is of sufficient value to satisfy the obligation of the surety.
The qualification of a natural person to act as legal surety must be evidenced by his affidavit and the affidavit of the principal obligor.
A legal surety may not raise his lack of qualification as a defense to an action on his contract.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A legal suretyship is deemed to conform to the requirements of the law or order pursuant to which it is given, except as provided by Article 3067.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A surety is not liable for a sum in excess of that expressly stated in his contract. A legal suretyship may contain terms more favorable to the creditor than those required by the law or order pursuant to which it is given, but it may not provide for a time longer than is provided by law for bringing an action against the surety.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
Legal suretyship may be given whenever the law requires or permits a person to give security for an obligation. The principal obligor may in lieu of legal suretyship deposit a sum equal to the amount for which he is to furnish security to be held in pledge as security for his obligation.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
No judgment shall be rendered against a legal surety unless the creditor obtains judgment against the principal obligor fixing the amount of the latter's liability to the creditor or unless the amount of that liability has otherwise been fixed. The creditor may join the surety and principal obligor in the same action.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
If a legal surety ceases to possess required qualifications or becomes insolvent or bankrupt, any interested person may demand that the principal obligor furnish additional security in the same amount and upon the same terms as those given by the existing surety for the performance of the obligation.
Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.
Amended by Acts 1981, No. 782, §1, eff. July 28, 1981; Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise shall be made in writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
When a compromise effects a transfer or renunciation of rights, the parties shall have the capacity, and the contract shall meet the requirement of form, prescribed for the transfer or renunciation.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
The civil consequences of an unlawful act giving rise to a criminal action may be the object of a compromise, but the criminal action itself shall not be extinguished by the compromise.
A compromise may relate to the patrimonial effects of a person's civil status, but that civil status cannot be changed by the compromise.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise entered into by one of multiple persons with an interest in the same matter does not bind the others, nor can it be raised by them as a defense, unless the matter compromised is a solidary obligation.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise does not affect rights subsequently acquired by a party, unless those rights are expressly included in the agreement.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise is also made when the claimant of a disputed or unliquidated claim, regardless of the extent of his claim, accepts a payment that the other party tenders with the clearly expressed written condition that acceptance of the payment will extinguish the obligation.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that was compromised.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise does not effect a novation of the antecedent obligation. When a party fails to perform a compromise, the other party may act either to enforce the compromise or to dissolve it and enforce his original claim.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise may be rescinded for error, fraud, and other grounds for the annulment of contracts. Nevertheless, a compromise cannot be rescinded on grounds of error of law or lesion.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A compromise entered into prior to filing suit suspends the running of prescription of the claims settled in the compromise. If the compromise is rescinded or dissolved, prescription on the settled claims begins to run again from the time of rescission or dissolution.
Acts 2007, No. 138, §1.
A submission is a covenant by which persons who have a lawsuit or difference with one another, name arbitrators to decide the matter and bind themselves reciprocally to perform what shall be arbitrated.
A submission must be reduced to writing.
A submission must be reduced to writing.
Parties may submit either all their differences, or only some of them in particular; and likewise they may submit to arbitration a lawsuit already instituted or only in contemplation, and generally every thing which they are concerned in, or which they may dispose of.
One may submit to arbitration the damages incurred for a public offense; but it is without any prejudice to the prosecution of it in behalf of the State.
The power of arbitrators is limited to what is explained in the submission.
A. If the submission does not limit any time, the power of the arbitrators may continue in force during three months from the date of the submission, unless the parties agree to revoke it.
B. Prescription is interrupted as to any matter submitted to arbitration from the date of the submission and shall continue until the submission and power given to the arbitrators are put at an end by one of the causes in Article 3132, unless suit has been filed, in which case the provisions of Articles 3462 and 3463 shall apply.
Acts 1984, No. 782, §1.
It is usual to undergo* a penalty of a certain sum of money in the submission, which the person who shall contravene the award, or bring appeal therefrom, shall be bound to pay to the other who is willing to abide by it; but this covenant is not essential, and the submission may subsist without the penalty.
*Note error in English translation of French text; "undergo" should be "impose."
A. All persons may be arbitrators, except such as are under some incapacity or infirmity, which renders them unfit for that function.
B. Therefore, minors under the age of eighteen years, persons interdicted, those who are deaf and unable to speak, can not be arbitrators.
Acts 2014, No. 811, §30, eff. June 23, 2014.
There are two sorts of arbitrators:
The arbitrators properly so called;
And the amicable compounders.
The arbitrators ought to determine as judges, agreeably to the strictness of the law.
Amicable compounders are authorized to abate something of the strictness of the law in favor of natural equity.
Amicable compounders are, in other respects, subject to the same rules which are provided for the arbitrators by the present title.
Before examining the difference to them submitted, the arbitrators ought to take an oath before a judge or justice of the peace, to render their award with integrity and impartiality in the cause which is laid before them.
The parties, who have submitted their differences to arbitrators, must make known their claims, and prove them, in the same manner as in a court of justice, by producing written or verbal evidence in the order agreed on between them or fixed by the arbitrators.
The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for examining the matter to them submitted, and give notice thereof to the parties or to their attorneys.
The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for examining the matter to them submitted, and give notice thereof to the parties or to their attorneys.
Arbitrators have no authority to compel witnesses to appear before them or to administer an oath; but, at the request of arbitrators, it will be the duty of justices of the peace to compel witnesses to appear and to administer the oath to them.
Arbitrators have no authority to compel witnesses to appear before them or to administer an oath; but, at the request of arbitrators, it will be the duty of justices of the peace to compel witnesses to appear and to administer the oath to them.
The nomination of the umpire is either made by the parties themselves at the time of the submission, or left to the discretion of the arbitrators.
Whenever the umpire has not been appointed by the submission, the arbitrators have the power to appoint him, though such power is not mentioned in the submission. But if the arbitrators can not agree on this election, the umpire shall be appointed ex officio by the judge.
The umpire shall take an oath similar to that taken by the arbitrators, before examining the matter or the point submitted to him.
The arbitrators who have consented to act as such, ought to determine the suit or the difference which is submitted to them, as soon as possible and within the time fixed by the submission.
Arbitrators can not exceed the power which is given to them; and if they exceed it, their award is null for so much.
The authority of arbitrators extend [extends] only to the things contained in the submission, unless it has been stated that they shall have power to decide all disputes which may arise between the parties in the course of the arbitration.
The arbitrators ought to give their award within the time limited by the submission, and it would be null if it were given after the time is expired.
Nevertheless the parties may give power to the arbitrators to prolong the time, and in this case their power lasts during the time of the prorogation.
If the submission specifies a certain time for the examination of the cause which the arbitrators are to decide,* they can not give their award till that time is expired.
Amended by Acts 1871, No. 87.
*English translation of French text incomplete; should include "or for the return of documents."
If there are several arbitrators named by the submission, they can not give their award, unless they all see the proceedings and try the cause together; but it is not necessary that the award be signed by them all.
If there are several arbitrators named by the submission, they can not give their award, unless they all see the proceedings and try the cause together; but it is not necessary that the award be signed by them all.
The arbitrators may likewise pronounce by their award on the interest and costs; but their silence on that subject is not a cause of nullity. If legal interest would have been payable by law from date of judicial demand, such legal interest awarded by the arbitrators shall attach from the date the matter was submitted to arbitration.
Acts 1985, No. 571, §1.
The award in order to be put in execution, ought to be approved by the judge; but this formality is only intended to invest the award with a sufficient authority to ensure its execution and not to submit to the judge the examination of its merits, except in case an appeal is brought before him.
He who is not satisfied with the award, may appeal from it, though the parties had renounced such appeal by the submission; but the appellant before being heard on his appeal, ought to pay the penalty stipulated in the submission, if any has been stipulated; and this penalty shall ever be due, though the appellant afterwards renounces his appeal; but if he succeeds to have the award reversed, either in whole or in part, the court who shall pronounce on the appeal, shall order the re-payment of the penalty; but if the award is confirmed, the penalty which has been paid, shall operate no diminution on the amount of the award.
The arbitrators having once given their award, can not retract it nor change any thing in it.
The submission and power given to the arbitrators are put at an end by one of the following causes:
1. By the expiration of the time limited, either by the submission or by law, though the award should not be yet rendered.
2. By the death of one of the parties or arbitrators.
3. By the final award rendered by the arbitrators.
4. When the parties happen to compromise touching the thing in dispute, or when this thing ceases to exist.
Whoever is personally bound for an obligation is obligated to fulfill it out of all of his property, movable and immovable, present and future.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
In the absence of a preference authorized or established by legislation, an obligor's property is available to all his creditors for the satisfaction of his obligations, and the proceeds of its sale are distributed ratably among them.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
A written contract may provide that the obligee's recourse against the obligor is limited to particular property or to a specified class or kind of property.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
Security is an accessory right established by legislation or contract over property, or an obligation undertaken by a person other than the principal obligor, to secure performance of an obligation. It is accessory to the obligation it secures and is transferred with the obligation without a special provision to that effect.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
Security is personal or real.
It is personal when it consists of an obligation undertaken to secure performance of the obligation of another.
It is real when it consists of a right of preference established over property of the obligor or of a third person to secure performance of an obligation.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
Kinds of security include suretyship, privilege, mortgage, and pledge. A security interest established to secure performance of an obligation is also a kind of security.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
Security interest is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code, which specifies the kinds of property susceptible of encumbrance by a security interest and governs the manner of creation of security interests and the rights of the holders of security interests against obligors and third persons.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.
Unless expressly permitted by law, a clause in a contract providing in advance that ownership of a thing given as security will transfer upon default in performance of the secured obligation is absolutely null.
A clause in a contract obligating the owner of a thing to give it to an obligee in payment of a debt upon a future default in performance of an obligation is absolutely null.
Acts 2014, No. 281, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.